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Hector A. Torres 
Flight Time Conference 
The Disappearance of the Author and Chicana-Chicano Critical Discourse 
To compare money with language is ... erroneous. Language does not transform ideas, so 
that the peculiarity of ideas is dissolved and their social character runs alongside them as 
a separate entity, like prices alongside commodities. Ideas do not exist separately from 
language. Ideas which have first to be translated out of their mother tongue into a foreign 
language in order to circulate, in order to become exchangeable, offer a somewhat better 
analogy; but the analogy then lies not in language, but in the foreignness of language. 
(163) 
Karl Marx, Grundrisse 
Paralog{szomai, dep. To reckon wrong, misreckon, miscalculate 
Paralogism6s, false reckoning, a fallacy 
Paralogos, beyond calculation, that which is beyond all calculation, an unexpected issue, 
miscalculation 
Liddell and Scott, Greek-English Lexicon 
Introduction: Notes on a Paralogy 
In "Toward a Theory of Minority Discourses,"(1990), Abdul R. JanMohammed 
and David Lloyd address the complex question of the economy of the author-function as 
it affects minority writers in multicultural America today. Certainly there are faults in 
their narrative articulations as there are bound to be in any theory that moves towards a 
comprehensive grasp of its topic. But there is also much to praise in this work and even 
more than ten years later we can still learn a lot from it if we can put into practice many 
of the theoretical protocols they put into narrative. The aim they take on Western 
humanism and its values of self-interest is especially sharp. Most refreshing is their 
refusal to see minority discourses, and the subject position in particular, as simply a 
matter of the affirmation of essence. Their struggle for a theory of minority discourse 
calls for a dialectical exploration of the subject position minority writers occupy and that 
preoccupies them today: 
The project of systematically articulating the implications of that subject-
position-a project of exploring the strengths and weaknesses, the affirmations 
and negations that are inherent in that position-must be defined as the central 
task of the theory of minority discourse. (9) 
The placement of the definite article in italics before the nominal that expresses the 
essence of their theoretical project already begins to ~at the difficulty of the task. It is 
to their credit that they $eo/fr{quJstions of ontology into q:estions of practice, no doubt 
just to dispel this trick of language or the coercions of the dialectic to make their project 
appear to aim at a definite essence. The dialectic is essential if one is to steer between the 
essentialist and the non-essentialist implications of the subject-position and therein lie the 
coercions of the dialectic. In the postmodern condition, even the dialectic is likely to 
pose an illusion and an allusion to minority writers. This illusion and its attendant 
allusions, I will argue, stem from a fundamental paralogy accompanying the dialectic at 
every step of its movements. What I am here calling a paralogy in the dialectic is what 
Marx articulates as the sheer lack of analogy between language and money. My 
argument will be that this paralogy or miscalculation is one that belongs to all of us. 
Notwithstanding Karl Marx's warning against making analogies between the 
circulation of money and the expression of ideas in language, apparently neither the 
warning nor the lack of analogy have been sufficient to keep the analogy from being 
made. No one less than the founder of modern structural linguistics, Ferdinand de 
Saussure, made this effor, and today the misanalogy continues to hold cmTency in the 
linguistic theory of someone no less than Noam Chomsky. From Saussure's maneuver to 
turn signification into a species term of linguistic value to Chomsky's formulation of 
economic principles for the derivation of grammatical sentences, linguistic science has 
held economic metaphors in high regard. Similarly, today, the fields of literary and 
cultural studies abound with talk of cultural capital, symbolic exchange, and libidinal 
economy. However, in the train of Marx's warning against the language to money 
analogy, Gayatri Spivak is not having any of this talk, or at least as little of it as possible. 
In "Scattered Speculations on the Question of Value" Spivak not only repeats Marx's 
warning but argues specifically() against readings of Marx that take use-value, -Y 
I exchange-value, and ultimately, surplus-value, to be in a continuous trajectory. It is these 'continuist' readings, she adduces, that lend themselves to the false analogy between 
consciousness and labor-power, language and value. Critiquing such continuist readings 
of Marx, Spivak takes apart Marx's formula in the Grundrisse in which L_abor, Value, 
Money, and Capital are conjoined in a chain by the functions of representation and 
transformation. That is, as Value represents Labor and Money, so Money transforms 
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both Labor and Money itself into Capital. Spivak deconstructs Marx's function-chain of 
Labor-Value-Money-Capital not by providing neoclassical alternatives to the labor theory 
of value but by invoking the name of textuality. "This chain," she states, "is 'textual' in 
the general sense on at least two counts. The two ends are open, and the unified names of 
the relationship harbor discontinuities"(158). As Spivak explains, the work of the 
\ 7 
negative disrupts the functions of representation and transformation, taking their 
mappings from term to term far beyond their desired destinations. Representation, for 
instance, far from simply exhibiting the contradictions of money as both particular 
commodity and universal equivalent, ends up as sign of indifference among human 
beings caught up in the coercions imposed by capitalist exchange. Similarly, the origin 
of capital, as Marx is well aware, requires a founding moment, a moment prior to the 
capitalist mode of production. Such a moment would require a utopianism before the 
name, a communist estate that has yet to exist. In other words, the yield of abstract 
human labor would be use-values and exchange values without the medium of 
circulation, wages, prices, or profits. Somewhere, running around both inside and outside 
the circuits of exchange, Spivak might say in philosophical language, are materialist 
subjects super-adequate to themselves, that is, both, owners of their use-values and 
exprop1iated from it by Capital. This structural moment in the birth of capital, which 
Marx must posit as a historical possibility displaces the origin of capital first into a 
process and ultimately into an open-endedness. In sum, at both ends of the se1ies 
beginning with Labor and ending with Capital, Spivak finds only indeterminacy and thus 
little grounds for an analogy between language and money, thought and value, 
consciousness and labor-power. Indeed, she doubles her critique against such 
analogizing moves, first by insisting that revolutionary practice finds its rationale in 
precisely the lack of 'theoretico-teleologicaljustification"(161), and secondly by 
desc1ibing the careless deployment of an economic category such as use-value. It 
appears that the situation she described at the scene of writing where she wrote "Scattered 
Speculations" has marked time rather than marched forward: 
In the continuist romantic tradition anti-capitalist version, it is precisely the place 
of use-value (and simple exchange or barter based on use-value) that seems to 
offer the most secure anchor of social 'value ' in a vague way, even as academic 
economics reduces use-value to mere physical co-efficients. This place can 
happily accommodate word-processors .. . as well as independent commodity 
production (hand-sewn leather sandals), our students' complaints that they read 
literature for pleasure not interpretation, as well as most of our 'creative' 
colleagues' amused contempt for criticism beyond the review, and mainstream 
critics' hostility to 'theory.' (162) 
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Here, Spivak's essentialist strategy is to place false analogies between linguistic and 
economic value within continuist readings of the use-value/exchange-value distinction, 
displaying what little use she has certainly for the continuist tradition, the false analogy, 
and the variety of ideological effects and practices they sanction as social values. She 
doesn't linger long over this essentialism as she quickly reiterates her own lack of 
foundation: "In my reading, on the other hand, it is use-value that puts the entire textual 
chain of Value into question and thus allows us a glimpse of the possibility that even 
textualization (which is already in advance upon the control implicit in linguistic or 
semiotic reductionism) may be no more than a way of holding randomness at bay" (162). 
Use-value has this unsettling property because it will not stay on the input side of 
exchange-value but occupies it on the output side as well, which is to say nothing more 
than that it can never be counted absent from capitalist circulation. This said, Spivak's 
careful placement of the name 'textualization' in the gap between order and chaos affords 
her a hinge that could be called a syntax inasmuch as it arranges linguistic and economic 
value into two incommensurable orders of human experience. If the arrangement holds, 
ideas will not run alongside language, but will instead keep in line with Marx's warning. 
In the meantime, language and the economy will indeed run alongside each other in 
parallel lines, which, if these ever meet again, their bending will end in a gross 
miscalculation or paralogy. 
It is precisely this paralogy, lack of analogy, or outright miscalculation over the 
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independent figures of language and money that I we1:1ld-l-ik..e to ex pl or¢ today. This 
exploration seems all the more wan-anted at a time when the reduction of the self-
presence of the Cartesian subject to a grammatical function with a heartbeat is regarded 
not only with alarm but sometimes with the hostility Spivak speaks about. Roland 
Barthes' postmodern enonce that the capital A Author died sometime ago continues to be 
read literally. This is oftentimes done with little regard for what Barthes says about the 
Scriptor and the Lector, performance in general, or, for me, most surprisingly, the 
performative contradiction housed in the enunciation itself. ff taken with humor rather 
than horror, the fact that Hannibal Lecter is running around loose, like a subject super-
adequate to itself, might be a way to disarm the metaphor of the death of the Authot) 
Furthermore, when Michel Foucault asks "What is An Author?" the question opens up a 
gap between enonce and enunciation from which issues a linguistic excess that institutes, 
if it wasn't already an institute, the Author-function. The Author-function spells out 
neither a literal end for subjects or subjectivity nor threatens writing in any way. 
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Foucault tells us as much when he c01Telates the death of God with the disappearance of 
the human subject: 
It is not enough, however, to repeat the empty affirmation that the author has 
disappeared. For the same reason, it is not enough to keep repeating (after 
Nietzsche) that God and man have died a common death. Instead, we must locate 
the space left empty by the author's disappearance, follow the distribution of gaps 
and breaches, and watch for the openings that this disappearance uncovers. 
Hence, to read the disappearance of the author as a literal phenomenon that threatens 
writing is to miscalculate the scope of the performative contradiction and to miss the call 
for the empilical work of discourse analysis Foucault points to through both enonce and 
enunciation. As far as the scope of the performative contradiction, the competence to 
utter it banks on the duplicity of postmodern knowledge, or even on that kind of 
knowledge that elsewhere Foucault calls disqualified. It is perhaps Jean-Fran<:;:ois 
Lyotard who best and most explicitly articulates postmodern knowledge as a paralogy 
present in both positive and hermeneutic knowledge. To be sure, the generation and 
legitimation of postmodern knowledge does not displace the protocols of scientific 
method, but neither does it exalt them above other modes of knowledge. Instead, because 
all forms of knowledge take the form of distinct language games, each of which will have 
its own mode of legitimation, postmodern knowledge calls for competence in nairntivity, 
in the art of telling stories (1984). For the discourses of science this narrative criterion 
has increasingly grown in magnitude the more researchers locate themselves in the field 
of the observer's gaze.~o doubt, Western science may be narrativized as just such a 
series of moves, which b~~-th Copernicus and in our time tany over fractals. 
__,,,.~ 
Perhaps it is such a line that Lyotard draws when he describes postmodern science: 
Postmodern science- by concerning itself with such things as undecidables, the 
limits of precise control, conflicts characterized by incomplete information, 
'fracta,' catastrophes, and pragmatic paradoxes- is themizing its own evolution 
as discontinuous, catastrophic, nonrectifiable, and paradoxical. It is changing the 
meaning of the word knowledge, while expressing how such change can take 
place. It is producing not the known, but the unknown. And it suggests a model 
of legitimation that has nothing to do with maximized petformance, but has as its 
basis difference understood as paralogy. (60) 
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This description sufficiently accounts for he pe1formative contradiction that declares the 
v . death of the Author at the scene of writing. Should we nq say mother words that the 
scope of the pe1formative contradiction is not equipped to satisfy the demand for a 
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perfect manfage between enonce and enunciation.I The satisfaction of the demand would 
be on the order of a Christian mystery like the incarnation, as when Saint Paul declares 
that Christians die to themselves but live unto Christ. Were the same to obtain with 
respect to the death of Author, being born again would not be a happy outcome since the 
subject could not be raised anywhere. Hence, why is the description of the death of the 
Author as a species of postmodern knowledge necessary today at all? After all, the 
history of the subject's death or disappearance Foucault condenses is a call for a critical 
discourse analysis. 1 Even if it has not always lived up to its promise, such a critical 
discourse analysis would keep a sharp eye on the auth01ity of the subject of Western 
Humanism to pronounce its own self-constitution via the genres of literature, philosophy, 
history, political economy, and of course, the hard sciences. On this account, the author's 
disappearance serves as a constant reminder that despite its exposure to the cold play of 
always already contingent linguistic signifiers, the Author-function is a condition of 
possibility, even, or especially, as a paralogy. In the face of the double binds of cultural ,,,---
A.. 
relativism and ethnocentrism, we know for instance that postmodern ethnography has 
found great value in the concept of irony, as a mode of critiquing the ethnos away from 
the privilege of Western scientificity. ,/ 
Now, at thi s point it may appear that I am arguing against someone who does .,yvtt 
exist or is not there-a straw subject so to speak. Since I am arguing against literal 
readings of the author's disappearance, I will now turn to the field of Chicano and 
Chicana literary and critical discourse as a concrete example, not of the author's 
disappearance but of the author's paralogy. It is my contention that the Author's 
paralogy is kin to all of us who work in the fields of minority discourses and that the 
kinship stems from the confusion of linguistic and economic value. 
Chicano and Chicana literary and critical discourse, proclaims critic Rosaura 
Sanchez, is occupying a historical irony that goes by the name of the postmodern. A 
declared Marxist and semiotician, Sanchez summarizes this postmodern irony thus: "The 
questioning and subsequent denial of the subject comes precisely at a moment in history 
when women and marginalized ethnic minorities are trying to assume their subject status 
to create a voice for themselves to overturn the 'othering' to which they have been 
historically subjected" (1987, 6). Sanchez assumes a view of the postmodern that 
empties it of any possibility for political engagement and she credits this empty reserve to 
deconstruction. For reasons having to do with deconstruction, postmodernism is overly 
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disposed to view reality too much as text and therefore does not distinguish enough 
between discursive and non-discursive reality. In league with deconstruction, 
postmodernism takes political aim at nothing and hits it. On her account of the 
postmodern, Chicano and Chicana literary production " .. .is far from postmodernist, as 
this is a literature marked by hist01icity, wherein representation is not problematic" (19). 
Except for a few works here and there, Chicano and Chicana literary production contests 
postmodemism as the cultural dominant of Anglo-American letters and criticism, asserts 
Sanchez. And as for those works that display features of the postmodern, these do not 
fare well under her scrutiny because they display politically and aesthetically" ... a 
contradictory combination of modernist and postmodernist notions" (9). Interestingly, 
for some historians of the postmodern such as Andreas Huyssen and Charles Jencks, 
these sites of contradictions between modernism and postmodernism are where the latter 
finds its potential for political engagement. Moreover, in The Condition of 
Postmodernity, it is just such a contradictory relation between modernism and 
postmodernism that David Harvey describes: "Eschewing the idea of progress, 
postmodernism abandons all sense of historical continuity and memory, while 
simultaneously developing an incredible ability to plunder history and absorb whatever it 
finds there as some aspect of the present" ( 1990, 54). Inasmuch as this holds true for a 
vast an-ay of Chicano and Chicana literary texts, as I maintain, it is their plundering of 
history that also lends them their political and aesthetic value. The absence of a \ h-
. h . d . l h I\ d d . - /\ patronage system, m ente money, or a rentter cu ture, sue as supporte mo ern1st 
writers, Chicana and Chicano writers exploit the value of the author-function in order to 
enter their literary productions into the market of exchange, which is to say quite simply 
that they want to make a living through the social act of writing . .2 I think it is fair to say 
that this is not just a matter of how much or how little history enters their works, but what 
works in the postmodern. But perhaps the question of modernism and postmodernism is 
an old one and so in repeating it here I-we-experience a lag time. But if there is lag 
time, then there is also a resistance. This lag time and resistance are what define for me 
the postmodern irony Sanchez decries. For instance, it is not at all clear to me that the 
mark of historicity in Chicano/Chicana literary discourses implies that representation is 
unproblematic. More than one critic of this American variety of literature has addressed 
its vast concern with history but not simply to declare it as an unproblematic turn or 
trope. On the premise that history and representation are unproblematic for Chicano-
Chicana literary discourses, Sanchez's argument fails to distribute a middle term, namely 
language itself. Bearing in mind the lack of analogy between language and money, this is 
like saying that the exchange of commodities needs no universal equivalent. Here, we 
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should recall however that none other than Saussure exploits this lack of analogy just so 
as to illustrate the mediating function of langue in the exchange of all paroles. 
Saussure conceives of signification in general and linguistic value in particular in 
economic terms. The systems of langue allow not only like things such as words to be 
compared and exc~anged. t ut equally, unlike things like words and ideas are also subject 
to such circuits ofq,b'r}ypa;iso~ and exchange (115). Based on the arbitrary nature of the 
linguistic sign, this displacement and replacement potential of langue has manifold .,,.--
implications. One of these concerns the status of concepts, which in langue, are never 
already formed and thus never the source of a priori value. Every piece of linguistic 
datum Saussure adduces points to one incontrovertible fact: 
Instead of pre-existing ideas then, we find in all the foregoing examples values 
emanating from the system. When they are said to correspond to concepts, it is 
understood that the concepts are purely differential and defined not by their 
positive content but negatively by their relations with the other terms of the 
systems. Their most precise characteristic is in being what the others are not 
(117). 
Before the close of chapter IV in the Cours, Saussure reverses the polarity of this insight 
into a positive value, but at this level of the argument it is clear that no representation of 
concepts can be conceived of as unproblematic. The mediations langue promotes at the 
speed of thought into conceptual equivalences in the exchange of paroles are not the sites 
of actual correspondences between the signifiers of latter with the signifieds of the 
former. While it' already a repetition to say that the mediations of value emanate from 
no fixed center in the system and are not the sites of stable correspondences between 
sound and thought, the mediations langue promotes into conceptual equivalences can be 
said to have the functional utility of theoretical fictions. Indeed, it is as a theoretical 
fiction that Spivak reads use-value in relation to exchange value in her scattered 
speculations on value in general. Perhaps it is the functional utility or use-value of these 
theoretical fictions that seduce us into the paralogy that the exchanges of paroles and the 
exchange of commodities are of the same order. It is easy to mistake these mediations 
for the process of commodity exchanges inasmuch as the computation of equivalence is 
accomplished in the head, as Marx say of commodities" .. . in one stroke" ( Grundrisse 
144). But then just as quickly can crises come about in both orders of experience. 
Witness the recent economic collapse of Argentina when it tried to fix the economic fate 
of its peso to the dollar. 
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And in effect my disagreement with Sanchez has to do with the relative lack of 
value her Marxist semiotic model places on Chicano and Chicana literary discourse that 
don't buy into a stable concept of history. However, that the concept of history has to be 
constructed is an ideological value upon which both linguistic and Marxist structuralism 
appear to collude. In Reading Capital, Louis Althusser stresses the necessity of 
constructing the concept of history: " ... it is essential to construct the concepts of the 
different historical times which are never given in the ideological obviousness of the 
continuity of time ... but must be constructed out of the differential nature and 
differential articulations of their objects in the structure of the whole" (1997, 103). 
Running around this concept of historical time is Althusser's desire to make of historical 
materialism a scientific discourse. Ironically, the value he places on a such a theoretical 
practice leads him to skirt dangerously close to the Hegelian conception of time, for him, 
ideological in all respects and to be differentiated from the would-be-science of structural 
Marxism. When Althusser speaks of a coupe d'essence or essential sfctfon, he is picking 
on those properties of Hegelianism that stabilize the concept of history into a spiritual 
unity and totality. To make a vertical cut across this conception of time is to bring to the 
light how everything relates to everything else: "the Hegelian whole has a type of unity 
in which each element of the whole, whether material or economic determination, a 
political institution or a religious, artistic or philosophic form is never more than the 
presence of the concept with itself at a historically determined moment" (95). It is in this 
light that one might say that Sanchez's conception of history and representation as 
unproblematic at any time is closer to He~an to Marx. If Sanchez stabilizes the / 
concept of historical time along HegeHa1b,1t is against the best insights of semiotic ~ 
science stretching from Saussure to A.J. Greimas. Simultaneously, it is not altogether 
clear whether Althusser did not himself also stabilize the concept in his search for a 
theoretical practice that would convert the Hegelian spirit into scientific hist01ical 
materialism. 
In the same year that Sanchez's essay proclaims this postmodern irony for 
Chicano and Chicana literature, Jose David Saldfvar echoes similar sentiments: 
It seems a bit ironic that just when all of these mainstream critics are talking about 
the end of the subject. .. that we should have Chicanos, people of color, and 
feminists, finally beginning to see themselves as subjects, as capable of action 
instead of just being acted upon .. .It may not be a coincidence that mainstream 
critics are talking about the end of the subject just when those people who have 
been cut off from power become aware of their potential role-as 
subjects-within the historical moment. (132 Interview with A. Chabram) 
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While Saldfvar might not play as easy as Sanchez with such terms as 'reality,' 'history,' 
'representation,' the conspiratorial tone of the sentence over the postmodern is disturbing. 
I agree that the postmodern houses an irony for Chicano and Chicana w1iters, but I do not 
believe that mainstream critics are pronouncing the death of the subject because minority 
discourses are on the rise or as a matter of conspiracy. It's not just that since Nietzsche 
the categories of cause and effect have been a problem to the extreme, but that it is 
equally problematic whether Chicano and Chicana subjects have ever just simply been 
acted upon. At the risk of hyperbole, or worse, shocking you, I would say that without 
the collective labor of mexicanos and mexicanas, the United States could not be what it is 
today. On the back of this hyperbole, it may not be too much of a stretch to say that 
collective labor requires no unique individual subjective substance, what Nietzsche 
critiques under the name of a subject-in-itself. Exposing the subject-in-itself as a 
fictitious fund for those concepts we value or reify the most- truth, morality, cause, 
etc-Nietzsche does not denote it nihilism pure and simpe: 
All the values by means of which we have tried so far to render the world 
estimable for ourselves and which than proved inapplicable and therefore 
devaluated the world- all these values are, psychologically considered, the results 
of certain perspectives of utility, designed to maintain and increase human 
constructs of domination- and they have been falsely projected into the essence 
of things. What we find here is still the hyperbolic naivete of man: positing 
himself as the meaning and measure of the value of things (WTP 13-14). 
It is not immaterial that Nietzsche is here referring to European nihilism at his scene of 
writing, since it would account for the talk of mainstream critics concerned with the 
Au_thor's disappearance. Indeed, the utility c1iterion Nietzsche deploys admits of no 
exceptions to the proposition that the world is founded on interpretation all the way 
down. 3 His revaluation of all values would solicit the epistemology of any critic, 
·. ·---
mainstream or not. In enunciating that interpretation springs from a utility function, 
Nietzsche reminds us not to confuse the stimuli of our nerve endings for truth precisely 
because there is no true world. Interpretation serves our human need for " ... a narrower, 
abbreviated, simplified world" (15). Herein, Nietzsche establishes the use-value of 
interpretations of the world and offers them to us wholesale. In the light of the paralogy 
against which Marx warns and for which Spivak has little use, Nietzsche's own 
interpretation of Western philosophy would occupy a position similar to the one use-
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value occupies vis-a-vis the market economy. This is in part the credit Spivak gives to 
her reading of use-value: 
For use-value ... is both outside and inside the system of value-determinations. It 
is outside because it cannot be measured by the labor theory of value-it is 
outside the circuit of exchange ... It is, however, not altogether outside the circuit 
of exchange. Exchange-value .. .is also a superfluity or parasite of use-value" 
(162). 
At one and the same time, Nietzsche's revaluation would be a superordinate category for 
all interpretations of the world and a subordinate one inasmuch as it is one other, or one 
more interpretation. It is in this light that I disagree with Saldfvar and Sanchez that the 
postmodern condition is ironic for Chicano and Chicana writers to a useless degree on the 
one hand, or that on the other hand, the 'othering' Mexican people in general have 
experienced in the United States has made them the objects of unilateral domination. As 
a collective force, in the absence of unified subject positions, both on the inside and 
outside of the border separating Mexico ~the United States, Mexicans have not 
simply interpreted the United States or just been acted upon by it but have continually 
changed it, both in terms of the Grundlage and the Uberbau. 4 I have in mind here the 
ranching knowledge which the Texas Mexican vaquerd passed on to the so called Anglo 
cowboy, the knowledge of acequia culture so called Hispanos in New Mexico passed 
onto white settlers, and generally the free rent squatters enjoyed for some time in 
California after 1848. These events are not immaterial because they fed the specific 
modes of production in what would come to be named the Ame1ican Southwest in both 
synchronic and diachronic scales. From an Althusserian conception of historical time, 
these events cannot be reduced to a mere sequence of events, , a l 'evenementiel (RC 108). 
The essential cut or section in historical time of which Althusser speaks, for all its 
Hegelian impossibility, would here reveal the need to theorize just how much these 
events as determinations in the formation of the United States continue to feed the modes 
of production today. If not, it would at least show up the need to theorize Chicano and 
Chicana history and historiography in a different light, not to say in the light of 
deconstruction's differance. 
To conclude, I point to the struggles of Jacques Derrida to spell out the non-
concept differance because it seems to me that his non-concept is our best effort to dupe 
the dialectic into reckoning with the empty funds of essentialism. That ability to think 
this region of our consciousness can have immediate implications for us. Inasmuch as 
1 1 
' ,, 
differance serves no kingdom, it can also expose the interests we invest in our subject-
positions, helping us to put into practice the normative Marxist ideal of critique and, more 
importantly, self-critique. It is the difficulty of the task that leads Derrida to spell out 
difference with a graphematic <a> to remind us of the erasure mark hovering over our 
most cathected lexemes. The erasure of concepts has on more than one occasion led 
Derrida to speak of the social act of writing in the postmodern condition as a matter of 
strategy and economy. Is there a lag time effect in repeating that this is a paralogy? 
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